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Abstract
This paper examines how a firm can strategically choose its capac-
ity to manipulate consumer beliefs about aggregate demand. It looks
at a market with social effects where consumers want to do what is
popular, to buy what they believe others want to buy. By imposing a
capacity constraint and setting a price just low enough for it to bind,
the firm can fool certain naive consumers into believing that demand
is greater than it actually is. This will in turn increase the willingness
to pay of all consumers through social effects. In equilibrium, the firm
will impose a capacity constraint whenever demand is lower than ex-
pected, even when the number of naive consumers is arbitrarily small.
(JEL D80, L00)
1 Introduction
Firms looking to build a favorable buzz around their products can often bene-
fit by selling out. Dining at a particular restaurant or attending a Broadway
show may be more attractive if the restaurant is usually full, or the show
difficult to get into. Concert promoters putting new tickets on sale will often
draw attention to a string of past sold-out performances.1 In professional
∗Tinbergen Institute and Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Edinburgh,
nick.vikander@ed.ac.uk, www.tinbergen.nl/∼vikander
1For an example with Bruce Springsteen and the E Street Band, see
www.shorefire.com/index.php?a=pressreleaseo=83
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sports, fans actively discuss and compare the consecutive sell-outs streaks of
different teams.2 The Boston Red Sox marked the occasion of 600 straight
sell-outs at Fenway Park with a widely publicized ceremony, where principal
owner John W. Henry threw 600 commemorative baseballs into the crowd.3
The desire to generate a positive buzz through sell-outs can cause firms
to act strategically. Palm is reported to have stocked low numbers of its Pre
phone to enhance the allure of the product, with analysts commenting that
selling out would be seen as an important success.4 Some firms have been ac-
cused of deliberately trying to mislead consumers, using perceived shortages
as a shrewd marketing tactic. There were widespread claims that Nintendo
deliberately produced too few of its new, widely popular Wii console in 2006
and 2007, in order to artificially increase demand.5 The Red Sox have also
been accused of trying to artificially sustain their sell-out streak, by selling
tickets to secondary sellers who are willing to bear more risk. Games are then
officially sold out even if some tickets never find their way into the hands of
fans. This keeps the sell-out streak alive, which is viewed as a great selling
point for the team.6
These examples all suggest that firms may strategically restrict capacity
to manipulate consumer beliefs about aggregate demand. However, this issue
does not seem to have received any attention up until now in the economics
literature. One potential reason could be the difficulty of reconciling this
idea with the common view that, in equilibrium, consumer beliefs should
be correct. By taking a somewhat different approach involving bounded
rationality, this paper aims to fill this gap.
I look at a market where consumers care about the popularity of what
they buy. Consumers are willing to pay more for a good if they believe it is a
hit, something many others want to buy as well. Whether it is wearing clothes
of a certain brand name, going to a particular performance at the theater, or
attending a concert or sporting event, these consumers care about whether
something is the “in” thing to do. I refer to this consumption externality as
a social effect.
I assume consumers can observe quantity sold but not quantity demanded,
2For an example in professional hockey, see http://hfboards.com/showthread.php?t=477736&page=2
3See “The Red Sox nurture a ‘Sellout’ Streak”, BusinessWeek, July 29, 2010
4www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=az5nzqH0Mt4M&refer=us
5www.cio.com/article/445316/Nintendo Wii Shortage Shrewd Marketing or Flawed Supply Chain
6www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/red-sox-s-ticket-policy-keeps-sellout-streak-
alive-with-help-of-resellers.html
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which means that a binding capacity constraint can influence their beliefs
about a good’s popularity. In the setting I examine, a binding capacity
constraint will cause some consumers to infer that demand is higher than
it actually is. These consumers do not take into account that the firm is
informed about demand, and has an incentive to influence their beliefs. I
refer to these consumers as naive, and the mechanism I explore depends only
on their numbers being strictly positive.
Specifically, I consider a two period game where the firm is fully informed
about the total number of consumers in the market, but some consumers are
not. Each consumer’s willingness to pay is increasing in his expectation of
quantity demanded, and a strictly positive fraction of consumers are naive.
Naive consumers are rational and update their beliefs about demand using
Bayes’ rule, except they do not directly condition these beliefs on the firm’s
equilibrium strategy.
The firm sets prices and also decides whether to impose a capacity con-
straint, which if imposed must remain in place for both periods. I show
that the firm can use a capacity constraint in period 1 in order to increase
demand in period 2. If the firm imposes a capacity constraint, it will set
a period 1 price such that the constraint exactly binds. Naive consumers
see that the firm has sold out, but do not realize that excess demand is ac-
tually zero. Instead, they form an expectation about the amount of excess
demand, reasoning that quantity demanded must be greater than or equal
to quantity sold. The mistaken beliefs of naive consumers will then increase
the willingness to pay of all consumers in period 2 through social effects.
In particular, the firm will impose a capacity constraint whenever demand
is lower than expected, but it will not impose a capacity constraint when
demand is sufficiently high.7 The firm faces a trade-off, since a binding
capacity constraint will increase period 2 demand beyond what it otherwise
would have been, but will also leave the firm unable to expand output above
its period 1 level. When demand is lower than expected, the firm will impose
a capacity constraint because, in its absence, expanding output in period 2
would not have been an issue. When demand is high, the firm will not impose
a constraint because there is little benefit to fooling naive consumers.
I also show that if the firm does impose a capacity constraint, then naive
consumers never discover that they have been fooled. Moreover, the results
7Throughout the paper, I will write “lower than expected” to mean lower than the
ex-ante expectation of both the firm and of consumers.
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continue to hold when social effects are weak, or when the number of naive
consumers is arbitrarily small.
The view that social effects can generate consumption externalities goes
back many years, and includes Leibenstein (1950) and Becker (1974). Leiben-
stein examined how individual demand may be increasing in aggregate de-
mand, and termed this the bandwagon effect. The bandwagon effect is related
to work on network goods, such as Katz and Shapiro (1985), where the even-
tual surplus from buying depends on the total number of consumers who also
buy. With social effects, however, the externality should be directly related
to a good’s popularity, not its sales. What matters is not how many people
actually buy, which may be limited by rationing, but how many people would
like to buy. Becker (1991) and Karni and Levin (1994) follow this route, and
assume willingness to pay is increasing in quantity demanded, not quantity
sold. Basu (1987) takes a related approach, where willingness to pay depends
directly on excess demand.
If the bandwagon effect were modeled in terms of informational cascades,
as in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992), then
the relevant issue would again be consumers’ expectation of demand, not
necessarily of sales. A consumer who knows that others have private infor-
mation about quality is interested in discovering how many people would like
to buy the good, regardless of whether rationing prevents them from actually
doing so.8
A key assumption of the paper is that consumers can directly observe
quantity sold, but not quantity demanded; when quantity sold equals capac-
ity, they cannot observe the extent of excess demand. This assumption is
more reasonable in some settings than in others. It may be easier to see the
number of people standing in the cue outside a nightclub than to see the
number of people inside. In contrast, a person glancing into a restaurant
may observe that the tables are full, without getting a good sense of how
many people have been turned away for lack of space. Similarly, people can
easily check the number of tickets sold for major sporting events, as these
figures are consistently reported in the press. It is more difficult to find pre-
cise information on the number of people who tried to buy tickets, but were
unable to do so.
Various papers have explored how a firm can benefit from rationing, ei-
8This distinction would only be relevant in a model combining informational cascades
and rationing, something which has yet to be examined.
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ther by imposing a capacity constraint or setting a price that creates excess
demand. One important difference is that none of these papers look at how
restricting capacity can influence consumer beliefs. Another is that they iden-
tify benefits to actually having excess demand, whereas I show the benefit of
having naive consumers mistakenly believe there is excess demand.
DeSerpa and Faith (1996) argue rationing can be useful if serving con-
sumers with a low intrinsic valuation generates positive externalities. For ex-
ample, many people appreciate loud cheering at a sporting event, but those
who tend to cheer the most may be unable to pay a high ticket price. A
random rationing rule then allows some of these low valuation consumers to
be served, which increases the willingness to pay of others. DeGraba (1995)
shows that the threat of future rationing can convince consumers to buy
early, which can increase profits if valuations become more heterogeneous
over time. Nocke and Peitz (2007) also look at the threat of future rationing,
and show how it can induce high valuation consumers to separate and pur-
chase before low valuation consumers. Denicolo and Garella (1999) consider
a durable goods monopoly, and show excess demand can be optimal if the
rationing rule is not efficient. Rationing then effectively shifts some high
valuation consumers from earlier to later periods, smoothing demand over
time and helping the firm commit to a higher price.
The paper in this literature that is closest to the current work is Becker
(1991). Becker also assumes that there are social effects to consumption,
and that willingness to pay is increasing in aggregate quantity demanded.
He shows that if social effects are strong enough to make aggregate demand
upwards sloping, then a capacity constrained monopolist may choose to have
excess demand. Marginally increasing the price could then cause demand to
collapse to zero.
Although Becker considers the same social effects, many other important
features of the model are different. He looks at a one shot game, where the
results rely both on demand being upwards sloping and on the capacity con-
straint being exogenous. There is no uncertainty, so influencing beliefs plays
no role. In contrast, I assume that the capacity constraint is endogenous,
and it is the presence of naive consumers, not any upwards sloping demand,
which drives the results. As noted above, there are also important differences
in the results themselves.
The idea that some consumers do not fully understand how other peo-
ple’s equilibrium actions depend on their private information is also quite
reasonable. The approach I take is related to that of cursed equilibrium, as
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in Eyster and Rabin (2005). It also follows in a recent strand of literature
in industrial organization looking at how firms can hide information from
boundedly rational consumers. I comment more on how this approach to
naive consumers relates to the literature in Section 4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 contains the analysis, and discusses the intuition for the
results. Section 4 presents some of the related literature dealing with naive
consumers, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A monopolist produces a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost, nor-
malized to zero. It faces a market of consumers who have unit demand in
each of two periods, where the discount factor is 훿 ∈ (0, 1].
The total number of consumers in the market is known to the firm, but
not to all consumers. There is a mass 푀 of potential consumers, but the
actual mass of consumers in the market is 푥푀 , where 푥 is a draw of a random
variable 푋 distributed according to 퐹 with full support on (0, 1].9
Each consumer’s willingness to pay for the good consists of two parts,
intrinsic utility and social utility. A consumer’s intrinsic utility from buying
is an independent draw from a uniform distribution on [−퐴0, 퐴], where 퐴0 >
0, 퐴 > 0 and 퐴0 + 퐴 = 푀 .
10
A consumer’s social utility from buying is Cq(p,x), where 퐶 < 1 is a
strictly positive constant and 푞(푝, 푥) is aggregate quantity demanded at price
p when 푋 = 푥. If a consumer does not buy the good, then his utility in that
period is zero. A consumer’s willingness to pay is equal to his expected utility
from buying, which is his intrinsic utility plus 퐶퐸[푞(푝,푋)]. Here, 퐸[푞(푝,푋)]
is the consumer’s expectation of quantity demanded taken over 푋.
There are two types of consumers: a fraction 1 − 훼 are informed and
sophisticated, while a fraction 훼 are uninformed and naive, with 훼 ∈ (0, 1].
9The mechanism should apply equally well if there was uncertainty about other con-
sumers’ preferences. However, modeling uncertainty in terms of the number of consumers
in the market has two practical advantages. It means a consumer cannot infer anything
about aggregate demand from his own willingness to pay. It also means that social effects
will just change the slope of the inverse demand function and not its intercept, which
simplifies the analysis.
10The assumption that intrinsic utility can be negative is simply to avoid corner solutions
after taking into account social effects, as explained below.
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Informed and sophisticated consumers observe the value of 푥 and are fully
rational, in the standard sense. Uninformed and naive consumers just know
how 푋 is distributed. They are rational, except they do not take into account
how the firm’s equilibrium strategy may be related to its private information
about 푥. Naive consumers update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, by reasoning
what values of 푥 are consistent with the quantity sold they observe. How-
ever, they do not condition these beliefs directly on the firm’s strategy. In
short, the firm cannot signal to naive consumers. Intrinsic utility is unrelated
to consumers’ information or degree of sophistication, so that the intrinsic
utility of both types of consumers is uniformly distributed on [−퐴0, 퐴].11
The game proceeds as follows. In period 0, nature draws a single value
of 푥 which is observed by the firm and by informed consumers. This draw
determines the number of consumers in the market, which is constant across
periods. In period 1, the firm decides whether to impose a capacity constraint
and, if so, chooses a value of 퐾 > 0. If the firm imposes a capacity constraint
with a given퐾, then quantity sold cannot exceed퐾 in either period: 푄푡 ≤ 퐾,
for 푡 ∈ {1, 2}. The firm also sets a period 1 price, 푝1.
Each consumer observes 푝1 and 퐾 if there is a capacity constraint, and
decides whether to buy a unit of the good. Aggregate quantity demanded
is then 푞1. If 푞1 > 퐾, then a mass 퐾 of consumers are allocated the good
according to some rationing rule, the details of which are unimportant for the
results. After consumers buy the good, they observe 푄1 but not 푞1, and naive
consumers update their beliefs about 푋. The firm earns period 1 profits 휋1.
In period 2, the firm sets price 푝2, and each consumer again decides
whether to buy a unit of the good. This gives aggregate quantity demanded
푞2. As before, if 푞2 > 퐾, then a mass 퐾 of consumers are allocated the good
according to the rationing rule. The firm earns period 2 profits 휋2, and the
game ends.
The firm chooses the strategy which maximizes profits, where I assume it
will only impose a capacity constraint if doing so yields strictly higher profits.
This will mean I need not consider situations where the firm is indifferent
between not setting a capacity constraint, and setting a constraint with such
a high value of 퐾 that it will never bind.
The assumption 퐶 < 1 will imply that the demand curve is downward
11A more general treatment would also include consumers who are uninformed but
sophisticated. This would introduce the possibility of signaling, which would complicate
the analysis. Assuming there are no such consumers allows me to concentrate on the main
issue of the paper, which is the firm’s incentive to manipulate naive consumers.
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sloping. While this is not essential for the analysis, it is necessary to have
interior solutions. With a uniform distribution of intrinsic utility, 퐶 ≥ 1
would imply that the firm always chooses to sell to all consumers in the
market. Downward sloping demand also means that there is no issue of
multiple equilibria. The assumption 퐶 < 1 sets the analysis firmly apart
from Becker (1991), whose results depend on demand being upwards sloping
on at least some interval.
To guarantee interior solutions, the intrinsic utility of the consumer who
is least willing to buy must be sufficiently negative. If all 푀 consumers are
expected to buy, then the willingness to pay of the consumer with the lowest
intrinsic utility is −퐴0 + 퐶푀 . I assume that
(
퐶
1− 퐶 )퐴 ≤ 퐴0
which ensures that this consumer’s willingness to pay is never greater
than zero. The assumption 푀 = 퐴0 + 퐴 ensures that 퐴0 and 푀 play no
further role in the analysis.
In terms of notation, I use a number of different subscripts. The first
subscript refers to period 푡 ∈ {1, 2}. The second subscript refers to whether
the firm has imposed a capacity constraint 푐, or not, 푢, which stand for “con-
strained” and “unconstrained”. For period 푡, I use 푞푡푐 for quantity demanded,
푄푡푐 for quantity sold, and 휋푡푐 for profits if the firm has imposed a capacity
constraint, and I use 푞푡푢, 푄푡푢, and 휋푡푢 if the firm has not. I abuse notation
and also use 푞푡푐 and 푞푡푢 to refer to the demand function in period 푡. Finally,
I sometimes use the subscripts 푁 and 푆 to refer to demand from naive and
sophisticated consumers.
3 Analysis
I first show how aggregate demand in a given period will depend on the
expectations of naive consumers. Because of social effects, the willingness
to pay of naive consumers is increasing in their expectation of quantity de-
manded. The only thing uncertain is the number of consumers in the market,
so willingness to pay can be expressed as a function of naive consumers’ ex-
pectation about 푋. I denote this expectation by 퐸푋 , and show how it affects
aggregate demand.
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The notation 퐸푋 distinguishes this from naive consumers’ ex-ante expec-
tation about 푋, which I denote by 퐸[푋]. These expectations will coincide
in period 1, but not in period 2 after naive consumers update their beliefs.
I let 푞푁 denote the demand of naive consumers, and 푞푆 the demand of
sophisticated consumers. Aggregate demand is then 푞푁 + 푞푆.
The quantity demanded by naive consumers is equal to their number in
the market, 훼푥푀 , multiplied by the fraction of these consumers for whom
the utility of buying exceeds the price. Naive consumers do not know the
value of 푥, so that buying gives expected social utility 퐶퐸[푞푁 + 푞푆]. Intrinsic
utility is uniformly distributed on [−퐴0, 퐴], which means that the fraction
of naive consumers who will buy is (퐴 + 퐶퐸[푞푁 + 푞푆] − 푝)/(퐴 + 퐴0). The
denominator equals 푀 by assumption, so that demand from naive consumers
is
푞푁 = 훼(퐴+ 퐶퐸[푞푁 + 푞푆]− 푝)푥. (1)
The demand from sophisticated consumers is given by a similar expres-
sion, where 훼 is replaced by (1 − 훼). An important difference is that naive
consumers know the value of 푥, so their social utility is 퐶(푞푁 + 푞푆), rather
than its expectation.
푞푆 = (1− 훼)(퐴+ 퐶(푞푁 + 푞푆)− 푝)푥. (2)
To see how aggregate demand depends on 퐸푋 , I need to express 퐸[푞푁 ] and
퐸[푞푆] in terms of 퐸푋 . That is, I need to show how the expectation of naive
consumers about their own quantity demanded, and that of sophisticated
consumers, depends on their expectation about the number of consumers in
the market. To do so, I take the expectation of both sides of (1) and (2).
This gives
퐸[푞푁 ] = 훼(퐴+ 퐶퐸[푞푁 ] + 퐶퐸[푞푆]− 푝)퐸푋 ,
퐸[푞푆] = (1− 훼)(퐴+ 퐶퐸[푞푁 ] + 퐶퐸[푞푆]− 푝)퐸푋 .
Solving this system of two linear equations in two unknowns yields
퐸[푞푁 ] =
훼퐸푋
1− 퐶퐸푋 (퐴− 푝),
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퐸[푞푆] =
(1− 훼)퐸푋
1− 퐶퐸푋 (퐴− 푝).
The expectation of naive consumers about quantity demanded is increas-
ing in their expectation of 푋. The two expressions only differ in terms of the
coefficient 훼 or 1−훼, the proportion of each type of consumer in the market.
I can now substitute these expressions back into (1), to express the de-
mand of naive consumers in terms of 퐸푋
푞푁 = 훼푥
(
1
1− 퐶퐸푋
)
(퐴− 푃 ). (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) and solving for 푞푆 gives the demand of sophisti-
cated consumers in terms of 퐸푋
푞푆 = (1− 훼)푥
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1 +
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸푋
)]
(퐴− 푝). (4)
Aggregate demand is then given by 푞푁 + 푞푆. In the absence of social
effects, 퐶 = 0, aggregate demand simplifies to 푥(퐴 − 푝). As expected, this
is just the number of consumers in the market whose intrinsic utility from
buying exceeds the price.
Looking at (3) and (4) shows that social effects do increase demand, but
not by shifting up the demand curve. Regardless of the value of 퐶 or 퐸푋 ,
the firm will not make any sales if it charges a price higher than the intrinsic
utility of the top consumer, 푝 > 퐴. If the firm did charge such a price, and
consumers expected no one to buy, then expected social utility from buying
would be zero. It would then indeed be optimal for no consumer to buy.
Instead, social effects increase demand by flattening out the demand curve,
reducing the magnitude of its slope.
Setting 퐸푋 = 푥 or 훼 = 0 gives the full information case, where all
consumers observe the value of 푥. There is then no distinction between the
two groups of consumers, and aggregate demand simplifies to 푥(퐴− 푝)/(1−
퐶푥). The denominator reflects the increased willingness to pay generated
through social effects.
The above expressions for 푞푆 and 푞푁 , (3) and (4), reflect the fact that an
increase in naive consumers’ expectation about 푋 has both a direct and an
indirect effect on aggregate demand. An increase in 퐸푋 directly increases
the expected social utility of naive consumers who buy. This will increase
their quantity demanded at any given price.
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The increased demand of naive consumers, combined with social effects,
are what create an indirect effect of 퐸푋 on aggregate demand. Higher de-
mand from naive consumers increases the social utility of all consumers who
buy. In particular, this increases demand from sophisticated consumers,
which in turn will increase the willingness to pay of naive consumers through
social effects.
In this way, social effects create a feedback mechanism through which a
small change in 퐸푋 can trigger a relatively large change in aggregate demand.
In particular, this will be the case when 퐶퐸푋 is close to 1.
Now that I have established how aggregate demand depends on con-
sumers’ expectations, I turn to the problem faced by the firm. The first
proposition considers a situation where the firm does not impose a capacity
constraint. It describes the demand the firm will then face in each period,
and its optimal price.
Proposition 1. Suppose the firm does not impose a capacity constraint.
Then period 1 demand is
푞1푢 =
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)}
푥(퐴−푝),
(5)
and period 2 demand is
푞2푢 =
푥
1− 퐶푥(퐴− 푝). (6)
The firm will set prices 푝1 = 푝2 = 퐴/2 and earn
휋1푢 =
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)}
푥(
퐴2
4
),
(7)
휋2푢 =
푥
1− 퐶푥(
퐴4
4
), (8)
giving total profits
휋푢 = 푥(
퐴2
4
)
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)
+
(
훿
1− 퐶푥
)}
.
(9)
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Proof. In period 1, the expectation of naive consumers about 푋 is just the
ex-ante expectation: 퐸푋 = 퐸(푋). From (3) and (4), period 1 demand from
the two groups of consumers is then
푞푆 = (1− 훼)푥
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1 +
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
(퐴− 푝),
푞푁 = 훼푥
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)
(퐴− 푝).
Total period 1 demand is 푞1푢 = 푞푆 + 푞푁 , given by (5).
Consumers observe period 1 quantity sold, 푄1푢, and since there is no
capacity constraint this must equal 푞1푢. Consumers are then able to infer the
exact value of 푥, because (5) is strictly increasing in 푥.
Period 2 demand is then also given by (3) and (4), but with 퐸푋 = 푥.
That is
푞푆 = (1− 훼)푥
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1 +
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶푥
)]
(퐴− 푝),
푞푁 = 훼
푥
1− 퐶푥(퐴− 푝).
Demand from sophisticated consumers simplifies to
푞푆 = (1− 훼) 푥
1− 퐶푥(퐴− 푝),
so that period 2 demand, 푞2푢 = 푞푆 + 푞푁 , is given by (6).
Both 푞1푢 and 푞2푢 are proportional to (퐴−푝), and marginal costs are zero,
so the optimal price is 푝1 = 푝2 = 퐴/2. This implies
푄1푢 =
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)}
푥(
퐴
2
),
(10)
푄2푢 =
푥
1− 퐶푥(
퐴
2
). (11)
Period 1 profits 휋1푢 are therefore given by (7), and period 2 profits 휋2푢
by (8). Total profits are then 휋1푢 + 훿휋2푢, which is equal to (9).
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In both period 1 and period 2, demand will be the sum of 푞푁 and 푞푆,
given by (3) and (4). The difference in demand between the two periods will
depend only on 퐸푋 , because naive consumers will update their beliefs about
푋 based on what they observe in period 1.
In period 1, naive consumers just have their ex-ante expectation 퐸[푋].
Consumers know that period 1 quantity demanded depends on 푥 according
to (5), and they are able to observe quantity sold, 푄1푢. The key point is
that when the firm does not impose a capacity constraint, then quantity
demanded and quantity sold must coincide. Naive consumers can then infer
the true value of 푥, and period 2 demand equals the full information case of
(3) and (4) with 퐸[푋] = 푥.
If quantity demanded is lower than expected, 푥 < 퐸[푥], then naive con-
sumers adjust their beliefs downwards after period 1, and demand will de-
crease in period 2. In contrast, if quantity demanded is higher than expected,
푥 > 퐸[푥], then demand will increase from period 1 to period 2. The fact that
demand is linear with maximum willingness to pay 퐴, and that marginal cost
is zero, explains why the optimal price is constant at 푝1 = 푝2 = 퐴/2.
I now consider the strategy of a firm which decides to impose a capacity
constraint. Period 1 demand will be the same as it was without a constraint,
푞1푐 = 푞1푢, given by (5), because naive consumers will still have expectation
퐸푋 = 퐸(푋). However, a capacity constraint will cause period 2 demand to
be different. It will do so by preventing naive consumers from inferring the
true value of 푥.
A firm which chooses a capacity constraint must decide on its level, 퐾,
and also on a price in each period. I first show that if the firm imposes a
capacity constraint, then it will exactly bind in both periods, and prices will
increase over time.
Proposition 2. Let 휋푐 denote the maximum profits the firm can earn by
setting a capacity constraint and optimally choosing 퐾, 푝1 and 푝2. Suppose
푥 takes on a value such that it is profitable to set a capacity constraint:
휋푐 > 휋푢, with 휋푢 given by (9). Then the firm will set 푝1 and 푝2 such that
quantity demanded equals capacity: 푞1푐 = 푄1푐 = 푞2푐 = 푄2푐 = 퐾. Moreover,
we will have 푝1 < 퐴/2 < 푝2.
Proof. As in Proposition 1, period 1 demand 푞1푐 is given by (5). Demand
is the same as without a capacity constraint, but now quantity sold cannot
exceed capacity, 푄1푐 ≤ 퐾. This means period 1 profits can be no greater
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than they would be without a capacity constraint: 휋1푐 ≤ 휋1푢, where 휋1푢 is
given by (7).
Suppose the firm sets 푝1 so that period 1 quantity demanded is strictly
less than capacity, 푞1푐 < 퐾. Then 푞1푐 = 푄1푐 < 퐾, and by the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 1, naive consumers can infer the exact value
of 푥. This means 푞2푐 is given by (6), as it was without a capacity constraint.
The only effect of the capacity constraint in period 2 is to restrict quantity
sold, 푄2푐 ≤ 퐾. Period 2 profits are therefore no greater than they would be
without a capacity constraint: 휋2푐 ≤ 휋2푢, with 휋2푢 given by (8). But this
contradicts 휋푐 > 휋푢, so it must be that 푞1푐 ≥ 퐾, and 푄1푐 = 퐾. That is, the
capacity constraint must bind in period 1.
Consumers then observe that 푄1푐 = 퐾 at the end of period 1, and naive
consumers update their beliefs about 푥. From (5), 푞1푐 is strictly increasing in
푥. Naive consumers therefore infer that 푥 ≥ 푥′, where 푥′ is the lowest value
of 푥 such that 푞1푐 ≥ 퐾. That is, 푥′ = 푥 would imply 푞1푐 = 퐾. Period 2
demand, 푞2푐, is then given by (5), but with 퐸[푋] replaced by 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥′].
I argue that the firm must set 푝1 so that 푞1푐 = 퐾, and hence 푥
′ = 푥.
If instead 푞1푐 > 퐾, then there would be strictly positive excess demand.
The firm could marginally increase 푝1 and still sell 푄1푐 = 퐾, which would
increase 휋1푐. This marginal change in price would also change the way that
naive consumers update their beliefs. From (5), 푞1푐 is strictly decreasing in
푝 but strictly increasing in 푥, which implies 푥′ is increasing in 푝. A marginal
increase of 푝1 therefore increases 푥
′, as long as quantity demanded is still
greater than or equal to capacity. This will in turn increase 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥′].
Period 2 demand is given by (5) but with 퐸[푋] replaced by 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥′],
so we know that 푞2푐 is increasing in 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥′]. A marginal increase in
푝1 therefore increases 푞2푐, and the firm can charge a higher price for any
given quantity sold. Period 2 profits are now higher as well, which is a
contradiction. It therefore follows that the optimal 푝1 must give 푞1푐 = 퐾 and
푥′ = 푥.
Period 2 demand is then given by (5), but with 퐸[푋] replaced by퐸[푋∣푋 ≥
푥].
푞푆 = (1− 훼)푥
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1 +
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)]
(퐴− 푝)
푞푁 = 훼푥
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)
푥(퐴− 푝)
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푞2푐 =
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥′]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥′]
)}
푥(퐴−푝)
(12)
Period 2 demand, 푞2푐, is proportional to 퐴− 푝. If the firm did not have a
capacity constraint in period 2, then period 2 profits would be given by 휋2 =
푝2푞2푐. These profits would be quadratic in 푝2, or equivalently quadratic in 푞2푐.
The firm would then choose 푝2 = 퐴/2. Denote the resulting unconstrained,
optimal quantity sold by 푄
′
2, which is (12) evaluated at 푝2 = 퐴/2. Of course,
the firm may not be able to actually choose 푄2푐 = 푄
′
2, since there is the
constraint 푄2푐 ≤ 퐾.
From Proposition 1, the optimal period 1 price without a capacity con-
straint is 푝1 = 퐴/2, with quantity sold 푞1푢 = 푄1푢, given by (10). The
unconstrained optimal price is the same in each period, 푝 = 퐴/2. We there-
fore have 푄1푢 < 푄
′
2, since 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] > 퐸[푋] implies 푞1푢 < 푞2푐. This means
that, fixing naive consumer beliefs at 퐸[푋] in period 1 and at 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
in period 2, the firm would like to increases quantity sold over time.
By (5) and 푞1푐 = 퐾, the firm with capacity constraint 퐾 will set period
1 price
푝1 = 퐴−퐾
푥
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)}−1
Period 1 profits are then 푝1퐾, so
휋1푐 = 퐴퐾−퐾
2
푥
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)}−1
(13)
Define the loss function 휆1(퐾) as 휋1푢−휋1푐, given by (7) and (13). It is the
loss in period 1 profits from selling quantity 퐾 rather than the unconstrained
optimum 푄1푢. The loss function is positive and increasing quadratically in
∣퐾−푄1푢∣. It takes on a value of zero at 퐾 = 푄1푢, as does its derivative with
respect to 퐾.
Define the loss function 휆2(퐾) in a similar way. It is 휋2푐 − (퐴/2)푄′2,
so the loss in period 2 profits from setting a capacity constraint 퐾 and
then choosing 푝2 optimally, rather than setting 푝 = 퐴/2 and selling the
15
unconstrained optimum 푄
′
2. The loss function takes on a value of zero for
all 퐾 > 푄
′
2, since then the capacity constraint does not bind in period 2 and
the firm can just sell 푄
′
2.
Period 2 profits, 휋2푐, are strictly increasing in 푄2푐 −푄′2 whenever 푄2푐 <
푄
′
2. This means that for any 퐾 ≤ 푄′2, the firm maximizes period 2 profits by
setting 푄2푐 as close as possible to the unconstrained optimum 푄
′
2: 푄2푐 = 퐾.
Any higher price would decrease 푄2푐 further away from 푄
′
2, and any lower
price would generate strictly positive excess demand.
By (12) and 푞2푐 = 퐾, the firm with capacity constraint 퐾 will set period
2 price
푝2 = 퐴−퐾
푥
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)}−1
and earn period 2 profits
휋2푐 = 퐴퐾−퐾
2
푥
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣ ≥ 푋]
)}−1
(14)
For any 퐾 ≤ 푄′2, the loss function 휆2(퐾) is decreasing quadratically in
퐾. It takes on a value of zero at 퐾 = 푄
′
2, as does its derivative with respect
to 퐾.
The firm chooses 퐾 to maximize 휋 = 휋1푐 + 훿휋2푐, which is equivalent to
minimizing 휆1(퐾) + 훿휆2(퐾). For the optimal 퐾, we cannot have 퐾 < 푄1푢,
since then marginally increasing 퐾 would decrease both 휆1(퐾) and 휆2(퐾).
Similarly, we cannot have 퐾 > 푄
′
2, since then marginally decreasing 퐾 would
decrease 휆1(퐾) while leaving 휆2(퐾) unchanged. This implies 푄1푢 ≤ 퐾 ≤ 푄′2.
For any such 퐾, 휆1(퐾) is increasing in 퐾 while 휆2(퐾) is decreasing in 퐾.
The derivative of 휆1(퐾) is zero at 퐾 = 푄1푢, while the derivative of 휆2(퐾)
is strictly negative. Also, the derivative of 휆2(퐾) is zero at 퐾 = 푄
′
2, while
the derivative of 휆1(퐾) is strictly positive. This implies that to minimize the
weighted sum of 휆1(퐾) and 휆2(퐾), the firm must choose 푄1푢 < 퐾 < 푄
′
2.
Setting 푝1 = 퐴/2 would give 푞1푐 = 푄1푢, and setting 푝2 = 퐴/2 would give
푞2푐 = 푄
′
2. Quantity demanded is decreasing in price, so 푄1푢 < 푄1푐 implies
푝1 < 퐴/2 and 푄2푐 < 푄
′
2 implies 푝2 > 퐴/2.
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The result shows that if the firm can profitably use a capacity constraint,
and if 퐾 is chosen optimally, then the constraint will exactly bind in both
periods. Naive consumers will then observe that period 1 quantity sold equals
capacity. Because they are naive, these consumers do not conclude from the
firm’s equilibrium strategy that excess demand must be zero. Instead, they
just infer that quantity demanded is greater than or equal to capacity.
In short, naive consumers will be fooled into believing demand is greater
than it actually is. Their expectation 퐸[푋] will be replaced in the expression
for demand by the conditional expectation 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]. The fact that
the capacity constraint exactly binds makes this conditional expectation as
high as possible. The new, more positive beliefs will increase consumers’
willingness to pay in period 2, both through the direct and indirect effect
described before Proposition 1.
Using a capacity constraint means that demand will always increase going
from period 1 to period 2. However, using a capacity constraint also means
the firm cannot fully taking advantage of this increased demand, because it
cannot increase output. The firm would like to sell strictly more in period 2
than in period 1, but the capacity constraint limits quantity sold to 퐾.
The optimal choice of 퐾 reflects a trade-off between period 1 and period
2 profits. The firm will choose a capacity level between the optimal period
1 quantity and the optimal period 2 quantity, where the exact value of 퐾
depends on how the firm weighs profits in each period.
Since quantity sold is the same in each period, prices must increase over
time. Moreover, the period 1 price is lower than that which would maximize
period 1 profits without a constraint, 푝 = 퐴/2, while the period 2 price is
higher.
Because the capacity constraint binds in both periods, naive consumers
never discover they have been fooled. They observe that quantity sold equals
capacity in period 2, which again leaves them unable to infer the true level
of demand. Unlike in period 1, the reason the capacity constraint binds
has nothing to do with influencing beliefs. The capacity constraint binds in
period 2 because the firm would like to increase quantity sold in response
to the increased demand, but it is prevented from doing so by its capacity
constraint.
The next proposition describes under what conditions the firm will impose
a capacity constraint.
Proposition 3. The firm will impose a capacity constraint whenever demand
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is lower than expected, but will not impose a capacity constraint if demand is
sufficiently high.
Specifically, there exists a critical value 푥′, with 퐸[푋] < 푥′, such that 휋푐 >
휋푢 for all 푥 ∈ [0, 푥′). There also exists a critical value 푥′′, with 푥′ < 푥′′ < 1,
such that 휋푐 < 휋푢 for any 푥 ∈ (푥′′, 1].
Proof. Suppose 푥 < 퐸[푋], and the firm does not impose a capacity con-
straint. By Proposition 1, it will then set 푝1 = 푝2 = 퐴/2. Quantity sold
is then 푄1푢 given by (10) and 푄2푢 given by (11). Per period profits are 휋1푢
given by (7) and 휋2푢 by (8). We have 푞2푢 < 푞1푢, since 푥 < 퐸[푥], so 푄2푢 < 푄1푢.
Quantity sold in period 2 is less than quantity sold in period 1.
Now say the firm imposes a capacity constraint 퐾 = 푄1푢, and sets 푝1 =
푝2 = 퐴/2. Period 1 demand and quantity sold is then the same as without
a constraint, 푄1푐 = 푄1푢, so 휋1푐 = 휋1푢. Quantity demanded equals capacity,
푞1푐 = 퐾, so naive consumers update their beliefs from 퐸[푋] to 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥].
This implies period 2 demand is higher than period 1 demand, 푞2푐 > 푞1푢, as
푞2푐 is given by (12) and 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] > 퐸[푋]. At price 푝2 = 퐴/2, the firm
can sell quantity 푄2푐, with 푄1푐 < 푄2푐 ≤ 퐾. Combined with 푄2푢 < 푄1푢 and
푄1푢 = 푄1푐, this implies 푄2푢 < 푄2푐 Profits are therefore strictly higher than
휋푢, and the firm would prefer to use a capacity constraint.
If 푥 = 퐸[푋], then the optimal price without a capacity constraint is
still 푝1 = 푝2 = 퐴/2. Naive consumers’ expectation of 푋 turns out to be
correct, so period 2 demand is just equal to period 1 demand. Quantity sold
is 푄1푢 = 푄2푢, given by (11).
If the firm imposes a capacity constraint 퐾 = 푄1푢 and sets 푝1 = 퐴/2,
then again we have 휋1푐 = 휋1푢. Just as above, we have 푞2푐 > 푞1푐 because
퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] > 푥. Setting 푝2 = 퐴/2 yields strictly positive excess demand in
period 2, so the firm can charge 푝2 marginally higher than 퐴/2 and still sell
푄2푐 = 푄1푐 = 퐾. Period 2 profits are therefore strictly higher than 휋2푢, and
the firm would prefer to use a capacity constraint.
Profits are continuous in 푥, so the same conclusion must hold for 푥 > 퐸[푥],
if 푥 is sufficiently close to 퐸[푥]. This implies there is a critical value 푥′, with
퐸[푋] < 푥′, such that 휋푐 > 휋푢 for all 푥 ∈ [0, 푥′).
Now suppose 푥 = 1. Then 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] = 푥, so period 2 demand is the
same regardless of whether the firm imposes a capacity constraint: comparing
(6) and (12), we have 푞2푐 = 푞2푢. A capacity constraint just constrains 푄2푐 ≤
퐾, so we must have 휋2푢 ≥ 휋2푐. By Proposition 2, we have 푄1푐 = 퐾, where
the proof showed that 퐾 > 푄1푢. Period 1 quantity sold is strictly greater
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than the unconstrained optimum, which implies 휋1푢 > 휋1푐. This implies
휋푢 > 휋푐, and the firm will prefer not to use a capacity constraint.
Finally, suppose 푥 < 1. Again by Proposition 2, if 휋푐 > 휋푢, then the firm
will set 푝1 and 푝2 such that 푄1푐 = 푄2푐 = 퐾. Moreover, 푄1푢 < 퐾 < 푄
′
2,
with 푄
′
2 given by (12) evaluated at 푝2 = 퐴/2. Recall that 푄
′
2 is the optimal
quantity sold if naive consumers held beliefs 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] and the firm was
not capacity constrained.
As 푥 tends to 1, 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] tends to 1 as well. Demand is continuous
in 푥, and 푞2푐 = 푞2푢 for 푥 = 1. This means that 푞2푐 must tend to 푞2푢.
In the limit, we must therefore have 휋2푐 ≤ 휋2푢. Since 휋1푢 ≥ 휋1푐, the only
way that 휋푐 ≥ 휋푢 can hold for 푥 sufficiently close to 1, is that both 휋1푢− 휋1푐
and 휋2푢 − 휋2푐 tend to zero as 푥 tends to 1.
For 휋2푢−휋2푐 to tend to zero, 푄2푐 must tend to the unconstrained optimum
푄
′
2. But 푄2푐 = 퐾, so 퐾 must tend to 푄
′
2 as well. From the proof of
Proposition 2, we know that푄1푢 < 푄
′
2, so if퐾 tends to푄
′
2, we have퐾 > 푄1푢.
But by 푄1푐 = 퐾, this implies period 1 output is strictly higher than the
unconstrained optimum, and in the limit 휋1푢 > 휋1푐 . For 푥 sufficiently close
to 1, profits are strictly higher without a capacity constraint.
The result shows that consumers will observe a sell-out when demand is
low, not when it is high. This is a very different conclusion than one would
likely reach if capacity was exogenous, or if the firm was uninformed about
demand. In that case, it would seem intuitive that a sell-out be associated
with high demand.
What drives the results is that the firm imposes a capacity constraint
with the express purpose of fooling naive consumers. Naive consumers do
associate a sell-out with high demand, because they ignore the firm’s strategic
behavior. It is precisely the fact that naive consumers make this inference
that gives the firm an incentive to fool them when demand is low.
The firm’s decision to impose a capacity constraint generates a benefit,
but also an implicit cost. The benefit of a capacity constraint is that it
makes period 2 demand higher than it otherwise would have been. The
discussion after Proposition 2 showed that imposing a capacity constraint
causes demand to increase after period 1. More to the point, it also ensures
period 2 demand is higher than if the firm had not imposed a constraint:
푞2푐 > 푞2푢.
The implicit cost of a capacity constraint is that the firm cannot increase
19
output over time. Without a constraint, the firm can maximize period 2
profits by selling 푄2푢, which is the optimal output given demand 푞2푢. If
푥 > 퐸[푥], then demand is higher in period 2 as naive consumers infer the
true value of 푥, and quantity sold increases over time. With a capacity
constraint, increasing quantity sold in this way is impossible. For certain
values of 푥, a capacity constrained firm will be forced to sell less in period 2
than if it had not imposed the constraint: 푄2푐 < 푄2푢.
Whether imposing a capacity constraint increases profits depends on how
the benefit compares to the possible cost. If demand is lower than expected,
푥 ≤ 퐸[푥], then demand would decrease over time without a capacity con-
straint. There would then be no question of increasing output in period 2,
and the firm would choose some 푄2푢 ≤ 푄1푢.
Proposition 2 states that a firm with a capacity constraint will choose
퐾 greater than the unconstrained period 1 quantity sold: 퐾 = 푄1푐 > 푄1푢.
This constraint will not force the firm to sell less than 푄1푐 in period 2, so
the implicit cost of a capacity constraint is zero. Its only effect is to increase
period 2 demand and increase profits.
The cost and benefits of a capacity constraint are different if 푥 is close to
1. A capacity constraint will then not fool naive consumers by very much,
since 퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥] is close to 푥. Imposing a capacity constraint therefore has
little effect on period 2 demand. In contrast, a large value of 푥 means that a
firm without a constraint would certainly expand output in period 2, which
leads to 푄2푢 > 푄2푐. In this case, the cost of a capacity constraint will exceed
the benefit.12
An important reason behind Proposition 3, as well as for the other re-
sults in this paper, is that aggregate demand is positively correlated across
periods. I make the stark assumption that it is perfectly correlated, so that
the number of consumers in the market is the same in each period. It is
positive correlation that allows consumers who see a sell-out in period 1 to
infer that demand will also be high in period 2, which in turn gives the firm
an incentive to impose a capacity constraint.
The assumption of perfect correlation is not necessary for this type of
mechanism to work, but it does simplify the analysis. If the number of
consumers in the market could vary across periods, then an important issue
12Proposition 3 leaves open the question of whether the relationship between demand
and the firm’s incentive to impose a capacity constraint is monotonic. If so, the firm would
impose a capacity constraint if and only if 푥 is below some critical value. I can show that
this is the case if 퐶 is small, but whether this holds more generally remains to be seen.
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would be whether the firm observes both periods’ demand before imposing a
capacity constraint. If not, then imposing a capacity constraint when period
1 demand is low would now carry a positive cost. The firm would have to
take into account that period 2 demand could still be high, in which case
expanding output would be important.
Proposition 3 also immediately implies the following corollary.
Corollary. The ex-ante probability that the firm will impose a capacity con-
straint is bounded below by 퐹 (퐸[푋]). This probability is therefore strictly
positive even in the limit as 퐶, 훼 or 훿 tend to zero.
This corollary shows there is a discontinuity in the firm’s optimal strategy
when some parameters equal zero. If 퐶 = 0, 훼 = 0 or 훿 = 0, then the
situation reduces to that without social effects. There is then either no social
utility, no naive consumers to fool, or the firm places no weight on period
2 profits. In such a case, a capacity constraint could never strictly increase
profits.
The situation is very different if these parameters are strictly positive but
small. As any one of them tends to zero, the range of 푥 for which a capacity
constraint is profitable does not.
The intuition is that both the cost and benefit of a capacity constraint
depend on the fraction of naive consumers and the strength of social effects.
If there are few naive consumers, then imposing a capacity constraint will
not increase period 2 demand by much over the unconstrained level. But
having few naive consumers also means that expanding output is less of an
issue, because demand does not change much over time. In the limit, the
benefit of a capacity constraint tends to zero, but so does the cost.
The next proposition gives an explicit expression for 퐾, the firm’s optimal
capacity constraint. The result shows that even though the firm’s decision
whether or not to use a capacity constraint is discontinuous in parameter
values, the equilibrium prices and quantities are not.
Proposition 4. The optimal capacity constraint 퐾 is given by
퐾 =
푥퐴(1 + 훿)
2푍
,
where
푍 =
{(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)[
(1− 훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+ 훼
]}−1
+
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훿{(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)[
(1− 훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+ 훼
]}−1
.
(15)
퐾 is increasing in 훿. As 퐶 or 훼 tend to zero, 퐾 tends to the unconstrained
optimum 푄1푢 given by (10), and 푝1 tends to 퐴/2.
Proof. Rearranging (5), Period 1 demand is given by
푞1 =
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)[
(1− 훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+ 훼
]
푥(퐴− 푝) (16)
If the firm sets a capacity constraint, then rearranging (12) shows period
2 demand is
푞2 =
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)[
(1−훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+훼
]
푥(퐴−푝)
(17)
If the firm sets capacity constraint 퐾, then 푝1 and 푝2 are such that 푞1 =
푞2 = 퐾. That is
푝1 = 퐴− 퐾
푥
{(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)[
(1− 훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+ 훼
]}−1
,
푝2 = 퐴−퐾
푥
{(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)[
(1−훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+훼
]}−1
.
Total profits are then (푝1 + 훿푝2)퐾, so
휋푐 = 퐴(1 + 훿)퐾 − 푍
푥
퐾2
where 푍 is given by (15). Profits are quadratic in 퐾, and the first order
condition gives
퐾 =
푥퐴(1 + 훿)
2푍
, (18)
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Taking the derivative of 퐾 with respect to 훿, this is positive if
푍 − (1 + 훿)∂푍
∂훿
> 0
Looking at (16) and (17) and the fact that 푞2 > 푞1 means that{(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)[
(1− 훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+ 훼
]}−1
>
{(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]
)[
(1− 훼)
(
1− 퐶(퐸[푋∣푋 ≥ 푥]− 훼푥)
1− 퐶푥(1− 훼)
)
+ 훼
]}−1
Comparing this with (15), it follows that (1 + 훿)∂푍
∂훿
< 푍 so that 퐾 is
increasing in 훿.
If 휋푐 > 휋푢, then by Proposition 2 we have 푄1푢 < 퐾. From (15) and (18),
퐾 is continuous in all parameters. The limit of 퐾 as 퐶 or 훼 tend to zero is
therefore equal to (18) evaluated at 퐶 = 0 or 훼 = 0. I now show that this is
equals to 푄1푢 evaluated at these parameter values.
Recall that 푄1푢 was given by (10),
푄1푢 =
{
(1−훼)
[
1
1− (1− 훼)퐶푥
][
1+
(
훼퐶푥
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)]
+훼
(
1
1− 퐶퐸[푋]
)}
푥(
퐴
2
).
Setting 훼 = 0 in (15) gives 푍 = (1 + 훿)(1 − 퐶푥), which implies 퐾 =
푥퐴/2(1 − 퐶푋). Comparing with the above expression, this is the same as
푄1푢 evaluated at 훼 = 0. Setting 퐶 = 0 in (15) gives 푍 = (1 + 훿), which
implies 퐾 = 푥퐴/2. Again, comparing with the above expression shows this
is just 푄1푢 evaluated at 퐶 = 0.
To complete the proof, note that 푄1푢 is the quantity demanded corre-
sponding to 푝1 = 퐴/2. If 푞1푐 = 퐾 tends to 푄1푢, then the firm which imposes
a capacity constraint must charge price 푝1 that tends to 퐴/2.
The result shows that the firm’s optimal capacity constraint퐾 approaches
the unconstrained optimal quantity sold, as social effects or the fraction of
naive consumers becomes small. For small values of 훼 or 퐶, fooling naive
consumers has little effect on period 2 demand. It is then quite intuitive that
the firm choose 퐾 = 푄1푐 close to 푄1푢.
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The optimal capacity constraint increases as the firm becomes more pa-
tient. By Proposition 2, the firm chooses a value of 퐾 between that which
would maximize period 1 profits, and the higher level that would maximize
period 2 profits. The firm’s choice of 퐾 therefore reflects a trade-off between
profits in these two periods. As the firm becomes more patient, it places more
weight on period 2 profits and it will choose a higher capacity constraint.
The final result follows in a similar vein, showing that a patient firm is
more likely to impose a capacity constraint.
Proposition 5. The ex-ante probability that the firm will impose a capacity
constraint is strictly increasing in 훿. Specifically, let 푆훿 ∈ [0, 1] be the set of
푥 for which 휋푐 > 휋푢, for given 훿. Then 훿1 < 훿2 implies 푆훿1 ⊂ 푆훿2.
Proof. Fix 훿 = 훿1 < 1, and consider some value of 푥 for which 휋푐 ≥ 휋푢. If the
firm does not impose a capacity constraint, then 휋푢 = 휋1푢 + 훿휋2푢, with 휋1푢
given by (7) and 휋2푢 given by (8). If the firm imposes the optimal capacity
constraint 퐾, then 휋푐 = 휋1푐 + 훿휋2푐, with 휋1푐 given by (13) and 휋2푐 given by
(14).
We have 휋푐 − 휋푢 = 훿1(휋2푐 − 휋2푢) − (휋1푢 − 휋1푐) ≥ 0. By Proposition 2,
we know that 푄1푢 < 퐾. Since 푄1푢 maximizes period 1 profits without a
capacity constraint, it follows that 휋1푢 > 휋1푐. The only way that 휋푐 ≥ 휋푢 can
hold is if 휋2푐 > 휋1푢. That implies both terms in brackets in the expression
for 휋푐 − 휋푢 are strictly positive.
Now consider some 훿2 > 훿1, and let 훿 = 훿2. By Proposition 1, the optimal
prices without a capacity constraint remains 푝1 = 푝2 = 퐴/2, so 휋1푢 and
휋2푢 are the same as when 훿 = 훿1. If the firm imposes a capacity constraint
with 훿 = 훿2, it can always choose the same values of 퐾, 푝1 and 푝2 as when
훿 = 훿1. By so doing, it earns the same per period profits 휋1푐 and 휋2푐. But
now 훿2 > 훿1, which implies 휋푐 − 휋푢 = 훿2(휋2푐 − 휋2푢) − (휋1푢 − 휋1푐) > 0. The
firm will therefore use a capacity constraint for this value of 푥.
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that there exists some 푥
such that 휋푐 = 휋푢 for 훿 = 훿1. In that case, 푆훿1 will be a proper subset of 푆훿2 .
This is indeed the case. Profits are continuous in 푥, and we have 휋푐 > 휋푢
for 푥 ≤ 퐸[푥] and 휋푐 < 휋푢 for 푥 close to 1. Moreover, 푋 has full support on
[0, 1]. So for any 훿, by the Intermediate Value Theorem there must be some
푥 with 퐸[푥] < 푥 < 1 for which 휋푐 = 휋푢.
The intuition behind the result is that the decision to impose a capacity
constraint is based on a trade-off between period 1 and period 2 profits. A
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capacity constraint has no immediate effect on demand, and so it cannot
increase period 1 profits above the unconstrained level. On the other hand, a
capacity constraint can be optimal if its positive impact on period 2 demand
is sufficiently large. A patient firm places a higher weight on period 2 profits,
and so finds a capacity constraint more attractive.
4 Literature on Naive Consumers
A key factor driving the results in this paper is the presence of naive con-
sumers, who are unable to directly infer anything about demand by observ-
ing the actions taken by the firm. Naive consumers are not irrational, and
in many ways are actually quite sophisticated. They understand the equilib-
rium strategies of other consumers, and they maximize their expected utility.
Naive consumers also use Bayes’ rule when updating their beliefs about ag-
gregate demand, taking into account the price and quantity sold that they
observe. These consumers are only naive in the sense that they do not realize
that the firm acts strategically, that its equilibrium actions will depend on
the information it has about demand.
This approach is consistent with evidence suggesting that people may not
fully realize how other people’s actions depend on their private information.
One such case is the winner’s curse in common value auctions. This can
occur if a bidder does not understand that others will only place low bids,
allowing him to win, if they have negative private information about the
object’s value. Another is where people may still trade in situations with
asymmetric information, where Bayesian Nash equilibrium predicts no trade
should occur. An uninformed buyer may not appreciate that the seller’s
decision to accept an offer will depend on his private information about the
good’s value, so that he unwittingly ends up buying a “lemon” (Holt and
Sherman 1994).
Eyster and Rabin (2005) consider naive consumers in games of incomplete
information, and define what they call a cursed equilibrium. A player is
cursed if he correctly predicts the distribution of equilibrium actions, but
underestimates the extent to which these actions correspond to other players’
types. The situation here where all consumers are naive corresponds to
their fully cursed equilibrium, where no player infers anything about demand
from the firm’s choice of price or capacity. The situation where only some
consumers are naive is somewhat different from what they call a partially
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cursed equilibrium. There, all consumers underestimate the extent to which
equilibrium actions are related to private information, but only to a certain
degree.
A related approach is Jehiel (2005)’s concept of analogy based expecta-
tion equilibrium, where each player groups others into analogy classes and
expects them to act as the average player in that class. In a situation with in-
complete information, for a certain analogy partition, this solution concept is
equivalent to that of fully cursed equilibrium (Jehiel and Koessler 2008). Be-
havioral equilibrium, as proposed by Esponda (2008), adds the requirement
that naive players’ beliefs must be consistent with the information revealed
from the outcome of equilibrium play. The results here can be seen in this
light, as naive consumers’ whose beliefs are manipulated never discover that
they have been fooled.
An important feature of this paper is that a capacity constraint can pre-
vent naive consumers from inferring the true level of demand. This relates to
recent work in industrial organization on how firms may try to hide informa-
tion from boundedly rational consumers. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show
firms may use shrouding to fool naive consumers who are not aware that it
charges add-on prices. Spiegler (2006) considers consumers who evaluate a
product by only sampling quality in one dimension, and shows firms may
obfuscate by randomizing over quality in other dimensions. Chioveanu and
Zhou (2009) and Piccione and Spiegler (2009) look at price competition with
framing, where firms choose both prices and the frames in which prices are
presented. By randomizing over both frames and prices, the firm can prevent
consumers from making price comparisons.
These papers all examine why a firm may want to prevent consumers
from learning about its own prices or products, or those of its competitors.
What I show is related but has a slightly different flavor: that a firm may
want to prevent consumers from learning about each others’ actions.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown how a firm can use a capacity constraint to manipulate
consumer beliefs about aggregate demand. Imposing a capacity constraint
and setting a price just low enough for it to bind can fool naive consumers,
who just infer that quantity demanded must be greater than or equal to ca-
pacity. Through social effects, this increases the demand of naive consumers
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in the following period. Social effects also mean this will increase the will-
ingness to pay of all other consumers, because they know naive consumer
demand has increased.
An important assumption throughout has been that when a capacity con-
straint binds, consumers are unable to observe the extent of excess demand.
For future work, it would be interesting to apply this idea to a model where
consumers choose sequentially and there is a possibility of an information cas-
cade. By imposing a capacity constraint, a firm could influence the extent
to which consumers observe the actions of those who have chosen earlier,
and therefore their inference about each others’ private information. The
question would then be whether imposing a capacity constraint could help
trigger a positive cascade, or help sustain one which has already started.
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